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Ambiguous phrases are the bane of researchers’ attempts to ensure acceptably high 
interrater agreement in the encoding of texts. When modal usages and their associated 
rationales are encoded as part of a text analysis, ambiguities arise in characteristic 
(and thus identifiable) ways. This article illustrates the typical sources of disagreement 
among coders involved in encoding data during a modality analysis and provides 
concrete strategies for improving interrater agreement.
Keywords: agreement; content analysis; text analysis; modality analysis
INTRODUCTION
For more than 60 years, the dominant social scientific methodologies for 
the quantitative analysis of texts have applied statistics to data consisting of 
word counts within thematic categories (Berelson 1952; Holsti 1969; 
Krippendorff 2004). These text analyses are part of a broader class of 
methodologies called “content analysis”—a generic term for statistical 
analyses of qualitative data (e.g., words, gestures, art forms, etc.). During 
the last three decades, a variety of alternative text analysis methodologies 
have been developed for affording statistical inferences about populations 
of texts. These more recent approaches involve not only the identification 
of concepts but also the encoding of relations among them. For example, 
researchers may encode Subject-Verb-Valence-Object (S−V−V−O) relations 
among words within clauses of the texts they analyze. Such “ordered 
tuples” are referred to as instances of a semantic grammar when each is a 
distinct unit of analysis having a fixed set of semantic relations among its 
ordered parts (Markoff, Shapiro, and Weitman 1974; Roberts 1989, 1997; 
Shapiro and Markoff 1998).
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Modality analysis (Roberts et al. 2008) is a semantic text analysis 
methodology for investigating how peoples’ intentions are discursively 
constructed. It is based on the theoretical premise that people motivate 
themselves and others by persuading them that their actions are possible, 
impossible, inevitable, or contingent. This persuasion is accomplished 
through the use of modal auxiliary verbs (Roberts 2008). For example, in 
light of a statement that one is “not able” or “compelled not” to go, one 
would stay (i.e., not go) if the statement persuaded one that “going is 
impossible.” Other modal forms convey contingency (noncompulsion or 
ability not to), inevitability (compulsion or nonability not to), and possibility 
(ability or noncompulsion not to). The technique may be applied in any 
study of rhetorical references to peoples’ intentions, whether made in the 
mass media or in small-group interactions.
Beyond conveying one of these four modal forms, every modal statement 
is (at least in principle) linked to a rationale. That is, assertions of possibility, 
impossibility, and so on are always open to question (e.g., “Why must I 
stay?”). Moreover, our experience has been that when no rationale for a 
modal statement is given, its use is more ritualistic than substantive: “May 
you live to see your children’s children” or “You, too, can be president.” 
Thus, we recommend that every modality analysis employ a coding scheme 
to classify the various rationales that might be used in accounting for the 
modal statements in one’s text population.
To date, modality analyses have been applied solely to populations of 
newspaper editorials and/or letters to the editor. When sampled from a 
newspaper with broad national readership, samples of these texts may 
(arguably) be generalized to corresponding populations of public discourse 
at a specific time or on a particular topic. For example, Roberts, Popping, 
and Pan (forthcoming) apply a modality analysis to a sample of Hungary’s 
largest newspaper’s editorials published between 1990 and 1997—a paper 
in which evidence is provided for a post-1989 shift in Hungarians’ 
politically based (or rationalized) rhetoric from more individualist references 
to Hungarians’ newfound opportunities (or possibilities) to more mutualist 
references to their responsibilities (or necessities). (Beyond consulting the 
original study for more detail on the study’s objectives and methodology, 
the reader is directed to Roberts et al. [2008] for an extensive discussion of 
modality analysis and its application.) In this article, we focus on issues of 
interrater agreement in coders’ assignments of modal forms and rationales 
to words and phrases within these editorials. Our objective is to better 
acquaint investigators who want to use this method with decisions required 
during the coding process.
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IDENTIFYING MODAL USAGES AND RATIONALES
each time a modal auxiliary verb is used, there are two verbs associated 
with the verb’s subject, namely the modal auxiliary verb (e.g., “can,” “must,” 
“ought,” “refuse”) and a main verb in infinitive form. These usages are not 
intended to convey facts or to describe events but to communicate something 
about the likelihood of the subject-verb-object link. as illustrated above, the 
fourfold character of these likelihoods results as the modal auxiliary verb, the 
main verb, both, or neither is negated—a pattern referred to by modal logicians 
as the “Square of Oppositions” (Horn 1989; Van der auwera 1996).
encoding of data for a modality analysis requires interrater agreement at 
each of the following four steps:
·	 Identification of a modal clause
·	 Identification of the modal clause’s rationale
·	 Classification of the modal clause’s form as possible, impossible, inevitable, 
or contingent
·	 Classification of the rationale according to a fixed coding schema
In this section, we focus on the first two of these steps by first explaining 
our criteria for identifying modal clauses/rationales and then describing the 
disagreements that arose in our coders’ applications of these criteria.
Identification Criteria
Differences in coders’ identifications of modal clauses may result from the 
character of the language at hand. For example, english speakers frequently use 
“have to” instead of “must” when indicating compulsion despite one’s inten-
tions, and they commonly use “may” to convey future possibility instead of 
permission. Moreover, modal auxiliary verbs are sometimes used in descriptive 
or diagnostic ways entirely unrelated to modality. Thus, neither of the follow-
ing excerpts contains a modal clause:
 . . . anybody who has just a little sense of technology knows that the old, 
Rotary-type phone switchboards have moving parts too. If these parts wear 
down or work inaccurately then we can hear the background noises. (May 
26, 1993, p. 10; note: This and all subsequent editorial citations are from the 
Hungarian newspaper, Népszabadság.)
An ethical point of view is usually justified in case of all human actions, 
because its subjects, humans, cannot be separated from their actions. (April 
1, 1994, p. 14)
The first quotation merely describes the physical causes of one’s hearing 
of background noises; the latter provides the author’s expert “diagnosis” of 
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why an ethical view is justified. In contrast, “a modal clause always con-
veys a judgment by its source about the motivations of the modal clause’s 
semantic subject. . . . In modality analysis, the coder’s challenge is to learn 
more about how the author understands others’ motivations (i.e., to get into 
the mind of someone who is getting into someone else’s mind, as it were)” 
(Roberts et al. 2008).
One does not have a modal clause if the modal auxiliary verb’s semantic 
subject is not a person (or a metonym for a person[s]). Thus, one would not 
encode the following as a modal clause, because the subject of “can” is 
“economy”:
Why are we pretending as if we have a market economy, which can be 
described by similar numbers like the german [economy]? (august 13, 1996, 
p. 3)
Yet the following would be encoded as a modal clause, despite the fact 
that its grammatical subject is not a person:
Hungarian society is just learning the rules of democracy, and developing the 
rules of the game, which must be adopted by politicians. (October 15, 1993, 
p. 15)
This is because its use of “must” is in passive voice, and it has people 
(namely, politicians) as its semantic subject.
as it turns out, this last quotation was not encoded after all, because it 
did not pass the second step in the encoding process. The editorial in which 
it appeared contained no rationale for “politicians’ compulsion to adopt 
democratic rules” in its first or last three paragraphs. More generally, every 
encodable instance of modal usage must meet the following criteria:
•	 The semantic subject of the modal usage must be a member of the popula-
tion (e.g., citizen and resident of the country) about which one is drawing 
inferences.
•	 Modal usages are not encoded when they are direct quotations of others’ 
words.
•	 a rationale for the modal usage must be explicitly given within one’s sam-
pled texts. (In our Hungarian research, only the first and last three paragraphs 
of each editorial were examined, in part to keep volumes of text comparable 
among editorials.)
according to the first criterion, modal auxiliary verb use should not be 
encoded either when its semantic subject is a nonperson or when they are 
persons who are expatriated or are citizens of other countries. Thus, the 
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following would not be an encodable modal usage within a study of 
Hungarian public discourse:
In Belgium patients receive a small booklet, in which all their prescribed 
medicines are registered. This way they can avoid the prescription of need-
less or incompatible medicines, especially when the patient visits many 
physicians. (January 27, 1997, p. 11)
according to the second criterion, the following modal auxiliary verb 
occurrences would not be encodable, given that they appear within a direct 
quotation from another source:
The rent increase is going to be compensated to the needy people, as the 
mayor said, “The value of subsidies will be differentiated, because some 
people have to cover the increased costs fully from their own resources, 
while others can expect greater support.” (November 23, 1992, p. 10)
according to the third criterion, appeals to the reader’s common sense 
are insufficient as rationales associated with modal usages:
Naturally, one association cannot take such a responsibility alone. (February 
1, 1994, p. 14)
[E]ven if they had to refer to him for some reason, his name was simply 
mentioned as “Géza Something” in the political columns of the newspapers. 
(March 29, 1996, p. 11)
To be encodable, a modal usage must be linked to a rationale that indi-
cates more than a general assertion that something is “naturally” impossible 
or that there were “some reasons” why references to someone were inevi-
table. each encodable modal usage calls for an explicitly stated rationale 
within its associated text.
Disagreements in Identification
Of the 485 modal usages identified by either of two coders in our sample 
of Hungarian editorials, only twenty-nine were coded by one but not the 
other. The vast majority of their differences (twenty or 69%) resulted 
because what one coder saw as indicative of the subject’s intentionality, the 
other interpreted as descriptive or diagnostic. The following excerpt is pro-
vided to convey the difficulty involved in drawing this distinction:
What did he get from the mailman? a check that could be cashed in a bank 
in graz, for which he was able to buy a gambling automat or playing machine 
that was written off there [in austria] already. (July 17, 1995, p. 11)
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Is the author merely describing the increase in someone’s purchasing 
capacity by virtue of having received a check in the mail, or is this a refer-
ence to the person’s intention to buy something that only became possible 
once the check had arrived? The latter would suggest its being a modal 
usage; the former would not. Or how about a reference to “a telephone 
company, which could build on the existing network” (October 13, 1992, 
p. 3)? Is this a description of a type of phone company or a reference to the 
phone company as an agent for which “building on the existing network” 
is a possibility? at times, even native speakers may disagree about whether 
an author has used a modal auxiliary verb to impute intentionality to the 
verb’s subject.
Beyond this, three of the coders’ differences were whether a rationale 
was provided, and three were on whether an auxiliary verb’s subject was a 
person. (In the latter case, one might reasonably ask whether the previous 
quotation’s author anthropomorphizes the “phone company” as an agent 
with a capacity to “build.”) In two additional cases, one coder failed to 
recognize that the modal auxiliary verb appeared within a direct 
quotation.
The final difference in coders’ identifications of modal usages was over 
a modal auxiliary verb that appeared in a question:
It is worthwhile to think about the issue: could we . . . regulate so much the 
different levels of interest-harmonization? (april 19, 1991, p. 6)
In this case, we have a serious question, which should not be encoded, as 
the author does not take a position on whether it is possible for Hungarians 
to regulate. On the other hand, coders should encode modal usages within 
rhetorical questions:
I think, the new leaders of the National Metal and Mineral Mines . . . inherited 
the more than 700 million forints burden of HaF [a used battery processing 
plant]. . . . [T]he authorities who permitted [this] do not provide any meaning-
ful financial support, saying that this is a [private] company’s investment. 
Can we talk about only a company’s interest, even when the country becomes 
a big waste disposal field? . . . [T]he people of gyöngyösoroszi . . . were not 
involved in the planning of the investment, they could only hear references to 
foreign plants, guarantees, experts. That is why they may have doubts today. 
(May 16, 1991, p. 12)
What distinguishes a serious question from a rhetorical one is that its 
author presumes that her or his audience knows the author’s position on the 
question as it is stated. Here, the author’s intent is clearly that Hungarians 
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are able not to refer merely to companies’ interests when public welfare is 
at risk. In contrast, serious questions leave the author’s intent masked. 
Thus, the coding rule here is that one encodes modal usages within rhe-
torical questions but not within serious ones.
A Note on Interrater Agreement
after identifying one’s units of analysis (here, modal + rationale tuples) 
and developing a coding schema, one may evaluate how consistently cod-
ers apply the latter to the former in practice. The following two sections 
focus on discrepancies in two coders’ applications of modal-form and 
rationale categories in the 456 modal + rationale tuples that they coded in 
common. Here we use kappa (Scott 1955; Popping 2000: 132-37) as our 
measure of interrater agreement. (Calculations were obtained using the 
computer program agRee 7.3 [February 2008] [Popping 1984].) The 
measure uses the marginal distribution over all coders as the basis for 
computing deviations from expected agreement and is appropriate when 
comparing a large number of classifications among trained coders.
Beyond documenting acceptable levels of intersubjectivity in one’s 
research, interrater agreement statistics like kappa afford occasions for self-
assessment. The following sections reach behind these measures to 
illuminate precisely where coder disagreements originate—problems to 
which we offer solutions in hopes of greater agreement in our (and 
hopefully our readers’) future studies. Indeed, given the ever-elusive nature 
of interrater agreement, intercoder reliability remains an open-ended 
project to every content analyst (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 
2002; Hruschka et al. 2004).
CLASSIFYING MODAL FORMS
In analyzing the Hungarian editorials, our research objectives only 
called for encoding instances of the modal auxiliary verbs, “can” (“could” 
or “able to”) and “must” (“have to” or “need to”). Instances of these verbs 
are typically used to convey possibility (“can,” “could,” “is able”), 
impossibility (“can’t,” “cannot,” “couldn’t,” “could not,” “is unable”), 
inevitability (“have to,” “has to,” “had to,” “must,” “need to”), or contingency 
(“mustn’t,” “must not,” “needn’t,” “need not”). after locating all such 
character strings in our texts, coders were asked to consider each string and 
then either to eliminate it from consideration (because it was not a modality 
usage, as discussed in the previous section) or to classify it into one of the 
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four modal forms that the string’s author intended to convey with it. Table 
1 provides a summary of two coders’ agreements and disagreements in 
making these modal-form classifications for the 485 modal usages that at 
least one of them coded (i.e., did not eliminate).
If one eliminates the twenty-nine cases already discussed in the previous 
section (i.e., cases in which only one of the coders assigned a modal form 
or rationale), the kappa statistic for this table equals .91 (z = 413.33). Most 
noteworthy is that twenty-six of their twenty-seven discrepancies occur 
when one coder coded an instance as “possible” that the other coded as 
“impossible.” as it turns out, of these twenty-six discrepancies, seventeen 
(65%) are for the single expression, “can only”:
These appointments created only the minimum conditions . . . to clear up the 
ruins. . . . The now appointed presidents and vice-presidents can only build 
on their personal credibilities. experiences show that this [credibility] fades 
away very quickly. (July 21, 1994, p. 3)
We can only rely on our physicians in an emergency situation. (February 28, 
1996, p. 11)
In reviewing these seventeen cases, our judgment is that in most 
(namely, thirteen) cases, both coders encoded them incorrectly. If one is 
only able to pursue a single activity, then one finds that activity inevitable 
(i.e., neither possible nor impossible, as assigned by the coders). The 
phrase, “can just,” is also commonly used in conveying inevitability:
Until then we can just hope that yesterday’s appointments do not start 
another round in the four-year long war. (July 21, 1994, p. 3)
accordingly, the author conveys in this quotation that “we Hungarians” 
must (inevitably) hope for peace.
TABLE 1
Two Coders’ Assignments of Modal Auxiliary Verb Instances to Four Modal Forms
  Coder 2
  Possible Impossible Inevitable Contingent Not Coded Total
Coder 1 Possible 217 24 0 0 15 256
 Impossible 2 120 0 0 2 122
 Inevitable 0 0 84 0 2 86
 Contingent 0 1 0 8 0 9
 Not coded 4 3 3 2 0 12
 Total 223 148 87 10 17 485
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So when might “can only” expressions convey possibility or impossibil-
ity? The answer lies with the words being modified by “only.” If “only” 
modifies “can,” then inevitability is the meaning being conveyed. However, 
if “only” modifies a different part of the clause containing the modal auxi-
liary verb “can,” the verb’s modal form is correctly coded as “possible”:
[an excavation] could prove unambiguously whether the skeleton . . . is that 
of Petöfi or not. [The excavation’s sponsor] argues that even the academy is 
not averse to approve the opening of the grave. However, in a letter . . . by 
[leaders of the academy] we can only read that the academy is for the freedom 
of research and it doesn’t want to object to the publication of points of view 
that are different from those of the academy. (September 27, 1996, p. 15)
Palotás . . . led the people’s movement to victory against the government, or 
at least he pressured it into a compromise with his hard siege of arguments, 
that nobody else [than Palotás] was able to achieve until the last minute, [but 
Palotás] was also from a governing party, or [at least] got his mandate as a 
Parliamentary Representative with the support of the MDF [the governing 
party]. (November 14, 1990, p. 7)
Note that in the first quotation, the author is not conveying the inability 
not to read (i.e., the inevitability of reading) a letter, but the possibility of 
reading “only specific content” within it. That is, “only” modifies “that the 
academy ‘is for freedom’ and ‘doesn’t want to object.’” It does not modify 
“can.” In the latter quotation, replacing “nobody else [than Palotás] was 
able” with “only Palotás was able,” reveals that this only + can combination 
is one in which “only” modifies the subject, Palotás. So why not code this 
as “every person other than Palotás was not able to achieve a compro-
mise”? The answer lies in the rationale linked to the modal usage. If the 
author provided a rationale for why compromise was impossible for every-
one else, then this latter coding would be appropriate. However, here the 
rationale lies with Palotás’s unique political connections (not others’ lack 
thereof) that made his achievement possible.
Impossibility is the correct encoding of only + can usages in which 
“only” modifies the rationale as a whole:
The government can only expect self-control from people who live on wages 
and salaries, when it explains why it is good for them in the long-run. 
(September 27, 1994, p. 3)
The first step of the reform is going to be the revision of the state’s tasks, i.e., 
in the long-term the state can only assume responsibilities that can be 
financed by the state at a high quality level. (December 20, 1994, p. 13)
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The first quotation can be rephrased as “the government can expect self-
control, only if it explains why it is good”; the latter can be rephrased as 
“the state can assume responsibilities, only if they can be financed at a high 
level.” Yet these phrases do not imply that “explaining why self-control is 
good” is the reason why “the government can expect it” or that “financing 
responsibilities at a high level” is the reason why “the state can assume 
them.” Instead, each imputes a necessary condition for a state activity:
•	 If the government does not explain why self-control is good, then it cannot 
expect it.
•	 If the state does not finance responsibilities at a high level, then it cannot 
assume them.
These latter rephrasings illustrate that “can only” conveys impossibility 
whenever the “only” modifies the rationale clause rather than a component 
of the modal clause.
Summarizing the last three paragraphs, only + can usages that convey 
intentionality should be encoded as follows:
•	 If “only” modifies “can,” encode as conveying inevitability.
•	 If “only” modifies another part (e.g., subject, object, main verb) in the modal 
clause, encode as conveying possibility.
•	 If “only” modifies the rationale clause, encode as conveying impossibility.
as should be clear at this point, encoding during modality analysis 
requires considerable familiarity with grammatical structure. Fortunately, 
high interrater agreement is still obtainable as long as such esoteric phrases 
as “can only,” “can just,” and “can hardly” are relatively infrequent in one’s 
sampled texts.
The only other recurrent discrepancy in coders’ assignment of modal 
forms was with three instances of the phrase, “can hardly”:
Somebody might be an albert Schweitzer in our small country, if he doesn’t 
have an impact factor, quotation index, and he isn’t supported by power, then 
he can hardly expect a progressive career. (September 29, 1993, p. 18)
One can appreciate the subtlety of this phrase by noting that whereas “can 
hardly” conveys impossibility, “can barely” conveys possibility. (“I can 
just barely fit.”) Nonetheless, one coder seems not to have been aware that 
this phrase (in Hungarian as well as in english) conveys impossibility, not 
restricted possibility.
Other discrepancies seem to have been due to insufficiently careful read-
ings of the text:
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[T]rade unions cannot make a decision even [when] they fully agree, and the 
MSZOSZ [a trade union] is even less able to do so. (January 3, 1994, p. 12)
Even if we can say many bad things about a politician or policy, we still can-
not generalize this to all politicians and policies, and we can say even less so 
that the facts exclude the existence of theoretical opportunity for an alterna-
tive policy. (April 1, 1994, p. 14)
Clearly, decision making that is “less than impossible” is itself impossible, 
and fact saying that (when compared to generalizing) is “less than impos-
sible” is itself impossible.
On the other hand, coder discrepancies occasionally resulted from 
overly careful text readings. For example, one editorial refers to “governing 
parties [that] lived in an illusion, according to which parties of the moderate 
right, were not going to be able to create an alliance” (april 8, 1997, p. 3). 
although the italicized phrase here conveys impossibility, the author 
asserts that this impossibility was illusory. Which does one encode: the 
modal’s explicit form or the author’s repudiation of that form? Because our 
purpose is to encode authors’ imputations of intentionality to their 
contemporary fellow countrymen, our encoding is of the author’s conveyance 
of the governing parties’ view that nongoverning parties’ alliance creating 
was impossible. The author’s repudiation of this is a mere descriptive (i.e., 
nonmodal) statement in light of subsequent historical events.
Note that this modal usage would be excluded from our data set, if it 
were to refer to Hungarians’ intentions during the distant past (i.e., if the 
intentions were not of contemporary Hungarians). at issue is “how distant” 
the past must be for an intention to be no longer considered contemporary. 
Here, the reference is to the intentions of members of the socialist and 
liberal–democrat coalition at the beginning of a still-ongoing political 
campaign. If our analysis were restricted to intentionality during this 
specific campaign, such a modality reference could not be considered 
contemporary. Yet, given our lengthier 7-year time frame, it seems 
reasonable to retain it as a datum for analysis.
Nonetheless, this case should not lead one to routinely ignore authors’ 
references to illusion. Consider the following illustration from among the 
twenty-seven discrepancies in assigning modal forms:
[C]an we expect with such low salaries that the best teaching and psycho-
logical talents are going to choose caretaker careers? Obviously this is only 
a vain illusion. (July 12, 1991, p. 8)
Here, by applying the term “illusion” to the expectation referred to in the 
rhetorical question, the author makes clear the meaning he wishes to 
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convey—namely, that we cannot (i.e., it is impossible for us to) hold such 
an expectation.
In sum, we can report exceptionally high interrater agreement in coders’ 
assignments of modal forms to identical instances of modal auxiliary verbs. 
However, improvement in this agreement is possible if “can only” instances 
are encoded in accordance with the clause or sentence-part modified by 
“only” and if “can hardly” instances are consistently encoded as conveying 
impossibility. Beyond this, minor additional improvements require coders’ 
remaining sensitive to the overall objective of encoding “imputed inten-
tionality” as well as to other nuances in authors’ language use.
CLASSIFYING RATIONALES
as already mentioned, every modal usage is (at least in principle) 
justifiable in terms of some rationale. That is, after asserting that some 
action or situation is possible, impossible, inevitable, or contingent, authors 
may always be asked to explain this possibility, impossibility, inevitability, 
or contingency. Why was it possible for Palotás to achieve the compromise? 
Why is it impossible for us to expect talented teachers to choose caretaker 
careers? Newspaper editorials afford authors opportunities to spell out 
precisely what their reasons might be for such imputations of intentionality, 
for example, in Palotás’s ability to achieve political compromise or in our 
inability to expect others’ choices. Yet such opportunities may not be taken 
either because authors refrain from making their rationales explicit or 
because they assume a diagnostic or descriptive stance toward their modal 
statements. (For example, an author might simply presume expert knowledge 
of all political actors and simply pronounce Palotás to have been the only 
politician “with an innate capacity” to achieve compromise.) In these cases, 
encoding would be inappropriate, as discussed at length in this article’s 
second section.
generally speaking, the number of rationale categories should be kept to 
a minimum. This not only improves interrater agreement but also reduces 
the number of cells in one’s contingency tables at the time statistical analy-
ses are performed. The sparser one’s table, the less powerful hypothesis 
tests will be. Our initial set of categories for classifying rationale types 
consisted of “political, economic, cultural, and security related.” To this, 
“welfare related” was later added to differentiate a fifth set of rationale 
instances poorly captured by these four. Coders were provided the follow-
ing guidance when encoding rationales:
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•	 Political rationales account for the possibility, impossibility, inevitability, or 
contingency of actions or situations as resulting from activities by politicians 
and political bodies toward strengthening or maintaining their power.
•	 Economic rationales explain them as occurring because of aspects of the 
market (e.g., efficiency or profitability) and segments of the economy (e.g., 
agriculture or industry).
•	 Cultural rationales account for them as resulting from a nation’s heritage, 
language, morality, and so on.
•	 Security-related rationales explain them in terms of safety, order, or the mili-
tary regarding protection of the nation’s citizenry.
•	 Welfare-related rationales justify them in terms of national well-being regard-
ing health, education, unemployment benefits, elderly care, and so on.
Table 2 provides a summary of two coders’ agreements and disagreements 
in assigning these rationale classifications to the 485 rationales coded by at 
least one of them.
Considering only the 456 rationales (and modal forms) encoded by both 
coders, the kappa statistic for this table equals .84 (z = 479.80). although 
the table’s most frequently interchanged categories are those of “politics” 
and “culture,” on closer examination, a more fundamental explanation for 
discrepancies in rationale-assignment emerges. The table’s most recurrent 
source of discrepancy is the erroneous assignment of a modal form’s topic 
to its rationale. For example, after criticizing contemporary attempts to 
apply the un-Hungarian label to political dissent, an editorialist writes that 
a citizen’s opinion may
be right, wrong, prejudiced, mistaken, undecided, or anything, but it cannot 
evaluate the nationality of the person at all. The government could have a 
Hungarian opinion, but a citizen cannot have a Hungarian point of view. a 
citizen is more and less than that at the same time. That is the difference 
TABLE 2
Two Coders’ Assignments of Rationale Instances to Five Categories
 Coder 2
  Politics Economy Culture Security Welfare Not Coded Total
Coder 1 Politics 141 5 11 0 0  8 165
 economy 0 120 4 0 3 3 130
 Culture 10 1 80 0 11 3 105
 Security 5 3 0 36 0 1 45
 Welfare 1 1 0 0 24 2 28
 Not coded 5 4 3 0 0 0 12
 Total 162 134 98 36 38 17 485
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between an opinion and the chanting choir of citizens in a military order. 
(august 5, 1993, p. 3)
In contrast, another writer argues that
the current government should pay at least as much attention as its predeces-
sor did, to the opinion and needs of the 3 million Hungarians who live abroad 
. . . otherwise the government cannot clear itself from the accusation that it 
signed an agreement “about them, but without them,” and such an accusation 
would be a very sensible issue, given that the leading party of the coalition 
is the successor of [the pre-1989 communist] party, that committed hardly 
reparable sins against Hungarian minorities between 1956 and 1988–89. 
(august 17, 1994, p. 11)
Note how the first quotation indicates that a single Hungarian (cultural) 
viewpoint is impossible for political reasons (namely, because citizens do 
not “chant” their political leaders’ opinions). The second, contrasting 
quotation indicates that a political act (a party’s clearing itself of having 
been insensitive to Hungarian expatriates) is impossible for cultural reasons 
(namely, given the party’s historical ties to a regime that was undeniably 
insensitive in this way). at least fifteen discrepancies in rationale assignment 
appear because of a coder’s nonrecognition that the subject matter of a 
modal usage is different from that of its rationale.
Beyond this, most discrepancies seem to have resulted from differences 
in how coders conceptualized the five rationale categories. For example, 
coder 2 assigned the politics category to rationales involving agreements 
among politicians from different countries, whereas coder 1 generally 
assigned security to such rationales. Moreover, coder 1 tended to assign 
culture to all rationales involving human suffering, whereas coder 2 gener-
ally assigned welfare in these cases. So despite its being acceptably high, 
we conclude that coders’ interrater agreement could be improved with more 
rigorous definition of our rationale categories. accordingly, we provide the 
following revised guidance for coders’ classifications of rationales:
•	 Cultural rationales are ones grounded in a country’s domestic past (i.e., those 
historical events or traditions that “make us who we are”). They may also 
involve writers’ references to a commonly accepted morality or to their own 
judgments (presumably, ones like those of their readers and most other citi-
zens). The following are three illustrations from our data of cultural rationales 
that reference the past:
	 My unexaggerated speech about majority participation in the 1956 upris-
ing is possible, because at the time “people were smiling, happy, with 
faith in the birth of a free Hungary, [and] were rejoicing with each 
other.”
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	 Many people’s creation of personal autonomy is impossible, because “a 
significant part of the society got stuck between the traditional and a civil 
lifestyle.”
	 People’s acting without consequences was possible, because of “the era 
. . . [that] is [now] over.”
Now consider three illustrations of self-referential cultural rationales:
	 My belief that a politician’s impartiality as a publisher is possible, 
because this is someone “very sympathetic to me.”
	 The prohibiting of the people’s faith and efforts is impossible, because of 
the “spiritual abilities [with which] [o]ur country has never been poorly 
endowed.”
	 Sufficiently strong emphasis of my understanding is impossible, because 
“I know what it is: not to know what is right, when I act appropriately as 
a human being.”
The following are three cultural rationales that refer more directly to 
morality:
	 Someone’s understanding of capitalism is impossible, because “his ques-
tions are moral questions.”
	 Distinguishing between legality and morality regarding the death penalty 
is impossible, because “[t]his is, after all, a question of conscience.”
	 acting for the country in ways worthy of obscenely high compensation 
is impossible, because such compensation would not be “acceptable in 
the eye of Hungarian citizens.”
Thus, in general, cultural rationales reference nations’ uncontestable his-
torical and ethical foundations—the source of their social order.
as depicted in Table 3, the other four rationale categories reference citi-
zens’ “application” or “manipulation” of their social order either “by using its 
internal workings” or “in response to external threats.” Following Swidler’s 
(1986) distinction (based on Peter Stromberg’s work) between ideology and 
common sense, our conceptualization of political, economic, security-, and 
welfare-related rationales is as involving ideological contestation whereas 
that of cultural rationales is as proffering common sense (see geertz 1975). 
The following are our revised guidelines for encoding noncultural rationales 
for modal usages within a nation’s discursive depictions of intentionality 
among its citizens:
•	 Political rationales account for the possibility, impossibility, inevitability, or 
contingency of actions or situations as resulting from manipulations of the 
national order’s internal workings by those of its citizens empowered to do so 
in ways consistent or inconsistent with the will of the nation’s electorate. 
Thus, according to this definition, interactions between politicians of different 
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countries are not inherently political. Moreover, not only might political 
rationales involve politicians and political parties, they may also involve 
other social servants such as unions, lobbyists, and corporate leaders. Unlike 
cultural rationales, the issue here is not with the morality of these leaders’ 
activities but with the extent to which their activities conform to public senti-
ments. The extent of this conformity may be depicted as arising because of 
the leaders’ ineptness, their corrupt self-interest, their desire to maintain 
power (e.g., via reelection or ongoing appointment), or their sincere desire to 
maintain the public trust or conform to the will of the electorate. Illustrations 
of political rationales from our data are as follows:
	 Signing a petition is possible, because “today is not too late to stop . . . 
government-initiated monopolization of . . . the media.”
	 Wiretappers’ unobstructed hearing is possible, because “it is . . . in the 
interest of [government-sponsored] eavesdroppers to have a good [phone] 
connection.”
	 Nonpunishment of corrupt politicians is possible, because “this system 
must be changed . . . [so that it] serves the electorate.”
TABLE 3
Guidelines for Assigning Rationale Instances to the Categories of Politics, 
Economics, Security, and Welfare
 Citizens’
their social order application of manipulation of
by using its  Economics  Politics
 internal workings •	 Regarding global markets •	 Regarding national 
     accountability
 •	 Producers vs. consumers •	 Leaders as public servants
 •	 Competition •	 Leaders: political, corporate, 
     special interest, union, lobby
 •	 Budget constraints •	 Ineptitude vs. corruption
 •	 Supply vs. demand •	 Vested interests vs. public trust
 •	 Technological developments •	 Reappointment and reelection
in response to   Welfare  Security
 external threats •	 Threat management •	 Threat response
 •	 Recipients vs. providers •	 Weak citizens vs. strong 
   of services   military
 •	 Recipients’ abuse vs. restraint •	 Threat containment vs  
 •	 Providers’ neglect vs.    prevention
   responsibility •	 Domestic vs. foreign violence
 •	 Services: subsistence, health, 	 •	 affinity vs. animosity 
   education, employment,   re noncitizens
   environmental conservation,  •	 Citizens’ (expatriates’)  
   elderly care, etc.   safety abroad
    •	 military viability 
     (expenditures)
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	 Punishment of lying news reporters is impossible, because “the rude and 
inhuman laws of the system distort all the participants.”
	 Ignoring potential corruption by appointed task groups is impossible, 
because “an ad hoc task group . . . can hide opportunities for abuse.”
	 Curriculum change is inevitable, because “current [education policy] . . . 
is an example of wrong [political] compromises.”
•	 Economic rationales account for the possibility, impossibility, inevitability, or 
contingency of actions or situations as resulting from participation in (i.e., 
using the internal workings of) the global economic order. Whereas the ulti-
mate legitimacy of democratically elected politicians’ activities lies with 
their nation’s electorate, the viability of economic activities is played out in 
markets that often span the borders of many nations. economic rationales 
incorporate references to market processes such as technological develop-
ments, budget constraints, supply versus demand, domestic or international 
competition, and so on. Some illustrations of economic rationales from our 
data are as follows:
	 Our [sarcastic] gratitude for Western acceptance of our labor is possible, 
because there was “selling [of] Hungarian firms to Western capitalists for 
nothing.”
	 Our experiences of sickening displays of wealth are possible, because “it 
is drawn from [black market] resources drawn away from the economy.”
	 Our choice between the collapse either of the budget or of public welfare 
is inevitable, because there is an imminent “shadow of inflation.”
	 excess public-sector employment is impossible, “because it would bur-
den the city with many million forints of additional expenditures.”
	 The government’s watering down of the Bokros-package [of strict social 
and economic measures] is impossible, because “Hungary . . . should posi-
tion itself as a strong discussion partner with its [economic] performance.”
•	 Security-related rationales account for the possibility, impossibility, inevita-
bility, or contingency of actions or situations as resulting from manipulation 
(or mobilization) of the national social order in response to impending or 
manifest threats to this order. They refer to the protection of law-abiding 
citizens from others’ violence, with the ultimate counterthreat of police or 
military force. Protection may enlist noncitizens with whom one has devel-
oped affinities, in alliances against others toward whom one has developed 
animosity. Defenseless citizens may be expatriated or locally resident. 
although threats may be hypothetical or ongoing (or range in severity from 
petty crimes to genocide), they are always depicted as originating with 
humans, namely domestic criminals or hostile foreigners. The following are 
illustrations of security-related rationales from our data:
	 In its diplomacy, the government’s going below a reasonable minimum 
is impossible, because this would constitute “abdicating responsibility 
for the interests of Hungarian minorities [in Romania and Slovakia].”
	 Our negotiations with Slovakia regarding a water-power plant have been 
impossible, because of “emotional, historical, and national scars of the 
past.”
	 Our accurate guessing of imminent political impasses with bordering 
nations is possible, because “[c]entury-long historical debates will not be 
closed.”
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	 Our hope that european institutions will force Romanian acquiescence is 
possible, because “[p]eople here always trust more in [the security poten-
tial from] european civilization than in europe itself.”
	 Our worrying about the fate of our mariners is inevitable, because 
“Hungarian boats on the Danube . . . are [being] pirated by Serbs.”
Note how the middle three of these illustrations refer to the historical 
origins of negative or positive sentiments from citizens of one country 
toward citizens of another country. In contrast to cultural rationales that 
may reference the domestic historical origins of a nation’s character, secu-
rity-related rationales often reference the international historical origins of 
animosities with or affinities to other nations’ citizens.
•	 Welfare-related rationales account for the possibility, impossibility, inevita-
bility, or contingency of actions or situations as resulting from applying the 
nation’s social order (i.e., providing its services) for the management of 
known threats. Citizens may either be “service providers” or “service recipi-
ents.” Recipients may be depicted as abusing the system or restrained in their 
use of it. Providers may be depicted as negligent or responsible. Known 
threats for which services may be provided include (in part) subsistence, 
health, education, employment, environmental conservation, and elderly 
care. Some illustrations follow:
	 Our tolerance of political ineptitude is impossible, because “the situation 
of our health care . . . threaten[s] us with further deterioration.”
	 [Unsuccessful] attempts to save patients are inevitable, because physi-
cians “are not like god. . . . even the smallest surgical procedures have 
risk factors.”
	 after having been publicly abused in the media, a citizen’s regaining of 
lost prestige or enthusiasm is impossible, because the media “do not 
inform the readers [of the citizen’s] professional and ethical exoneration 
from the charges.”
	 accounting for some Hungarians’ unauthorized access to government 
subsidies is inevitable, because “only those people should receive some 
kind of government [subsidies], who really need it.”
	 Hungarian society’s acceptance of “the new capitalists” is possible, 
because “[a]ccording to Imre Nagy, the capitalist is going to become a 
responsible citizen.”
Like political rationales, welfare-related rationales reference a nation’s 
domestic affairs. at stake with the former are the motivations of leaders 
when deciding which services the nation is to provide. Yet with welfare-
related rationales, the quality (not the existence) of services is at stake. 
Thus, the rationale is welfare related, not political, if political acts are 
criticized for their impact on social services. The converse holds if they are 
criticized for not heeding public opinion.
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CONCLUSION
This article has “opened our shop doors” to researchers interested in 
applying modality analysis within studies of rhetorical references to 
intentionality—especially to those involved in historical-comparative analyses 
of national discourse. By critically reviewing discrepancies in applications of 
our coding scheme, we hope to have both improved our methodology and 
conveyed it more clearly for others’ use. For instance, when identifying modal 
usages, we have provided guidelines for improved discernment of imputed 
intentionality (as distinct from descriptions or diagnostic statements) and of 
citizens referenced as (possibly anthropomorphized) semantic subjects. When 
identifying rationales, we recommend seeking them within rhetorical but not 
serious questions. and when classifying modal usages, we provide guide-
lines for encoding phrases in which the modal auxiliary verb “can,” is associ-
ated with adverbs such as “only,” “just,” “hardly,” and “barely.” But most 
importantly, our recommendations on rationale classification afford much 
greater depth and clarity to our definition of “national discourse” (i.e., the 
subject matter of the editorials we study). Let us be specific.
analyzing national discourse not only requires obtaining a sample of 
representative texts or transcripts, it also requires developing a nominal 
definition for this type of discourse. Our definition emerges from the 
domain of rationales that we associate with a nation’s discourse. Implicit in 
this domain (as delineated in Table 3) is a specific definition of nation.
Based on our rationale scheme, nation can be understood as a collection 
of citizens both (1) with an elected leadership that makes policies regarding 
services provided to these citizens and (2) within an environment that 
allows economic participation or that threatens the survival of the nation 
itself (i.e., of its leadership election, service provision, and/or economic 
participation). Citizens are thus people with electoral power, economic 
access, and rights to services. Leadership positions are contingent on 
citizens’ satisfaction with their leaders’ decisions. Services are contingent 
on providers’ responsibility in providing them and on citizens’ restraint in 
using them. Whereas anyone may participate in the world economy or may 
threaten a nation’s social order, only citizens may vote or receive their 
nation’s services.
In confining our research to this definition, note that we have thereby 
limited our analyses to discourse within democracies. Keeping in mind 
Stalin’s proviso, “It does not matter who votes; what matters is who counts 
the votes,” this definition allows us to speak of a nation’s “degree” of 
democracy (i.e., the extent to which its politicians respond to citizens’ 
votes/preferences). Likewise based on this definition, one may refer to the 
degrees to which nations ensure that citizens are provided services. Further 
 at University of Groningen on January 18, 2011fmx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Popping, Roberts / CODING ISSUES IN MODALITY ANALYSIS   263
variations are opened for consideration among nations’ cultural origins and 
their economic and security-related challenges. In short, emerging from our 
exercise in clarifying rationale categories is a concept of nation that has 
broad applicability to the countries of today’s world.
Yet repeated appeals to political rationales could just as well be signs of 
a vibrant democracy or of one in jeopardy. Welfare- and security-related 
rationales could likewise be used to convey hope or despair, as could cultural 
or economic rationales. So we return to the kernel of modality analysis and 
to the modal usages to which these rationale types are discursively linked. 
One might argue, for example, that a nation’s economic discourse is 
unproblematic to the extent that economic rationales account for citizens’ 
possibilities. Or its welfare discourse may be generally acceptable to the 
extent that welfare-related rationales account for citizens’ inevitabilities (say, 
by referring to what they must do as responsible providers and users of 
services).
Of course, modality analyses might be applied to populations of 
discourse other than national ones. Research on rhetorics of intentionality 
within corporate discourse or doctor–patient conversations, for example, 
would involve the development of corresponding rationale schemas that 
capture the discursive domain at hand. at issue, then, is how employees and 
employers, patients and doctors, and so on, appeal to these rationales in 
persuading and being persuaded of things possible, impossible, inevitable, 
or contingent for each other. Yet, at this point, we approach the limits of this 
article’s methodological scope and close with our hopes of having provided 
sufficient insight into the variety of substantive applications that modality 
analysis affords.
REFERENCES
Berelson, B. 1952. Content analysis in communication research. New York: Free Press.
geertz, C. 1975. Common sense as a cultural system. Antioch Review 33 (1): 5–26.
Holsti, O. R. 1969. Content analysis for the social sciences and humanities. London: addison 
Wesley.
Horn, L. R. 1989. A natural history of negation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hruschka, D. J., D. Schwartz, D. Cobb St. John, e. Picone-Decaro, R. a. Jenkins, and J. W. 
Carey. 2004. Reliability in coding open-ended data: Lessons learned from HIV behavioral 
research. Field Methods 16 (16): 307–31.
Krippendorff, K. 2004. Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. Thousand Oaks, 
Ca: Sage.
Lombard, M., J. Snyder-Duch, and C. C. Bracken. 2002. Content analysis in mass communi-
cation: assessment and reporting of intercoder reliability. Human Communication 
Research 28 (4): 587–604.
 at University of Groningen on January 18, 2011fmx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
264   FIELD METHODS
Markoff, J., g. Shapiro, and S. Weitman. 1974. Toward the integration of content analysis and 
general methodology. In Sociological methodology, 1975, ed. D. R. Heise, 1–58. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Popping, R. 1984. agRee, a package for computing nominal scale agreement. Computational 
Statistics and Data Analysis 2 (2): 182–85.
———. 2000. Computer-assisted text analysis. London: Sage.
Roberts, C. W. 1989. Other than counting words: a linguistic approach to content analysis. 
Social Forces 68 (1): 147–77.
———. 1997. Semantic text analysis: On the structure of linguistic ambiguity in ordinary dis-
course. In Text analysis for the social sciences: Methods for drawing statistical inferences 
from texts and transcripts, ed. C. W. Roberts, 55–77. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence erlbaum.
———. 2008. “The” fifth modality: On languages that shape our motivations and cultures. 
Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.
Roberts, C. W., R. Popping, and Y. Pan. Forthcoming. Modalities of democratic transforma-
tion: Forms of public discourse within Hungary’s largest newspaper, 1990–1997. 
International Sociology.
Roberts, C. W., C. Zuell, J. Landmann, and Y. Wang. 2008. Modality analysis: a semantic 
grammar for imputations of intentionality in texts. Quality and Quantity. (Prepublished 
September 12, 2008; DOI: 10.1007/s11135–008–9194–7.)
Scott, W. a. 1955. Reliability of content analysis: The case of nominal scale coding. Public 
Opinion Quarterly 19 (3): 321–25.
Shapiro, g., and J. Markoff. 1998. Revolutionary demands: A content analysis of the cahiers 
de doléances of 1789. Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press.
Swidler, a. 1986. Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review 
51 (2): 273–86.
Van der auwera, J. 1996. Modality: The three-layered scalar square. Journal of Semantics 
13 (3): 181–95.
ROEL POPPING is in the Department of Sociology at the University of Groningen, 
Netherlands. His research is on historical shifts in public opinion, values, and scien-
tific knowledge, primarily within the context of post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe. 
His book, Computer-assisted Text analysis, was published by Sage in 2000. He has 
articles forthcoming in Quality & Quantity (“Some Views on Agreement to Be Used in 
Content Analysis Studies”) and International Sociology (“Modalities of Democratic 
Transformation: Forms of Public Discourse within Hungary’s Largest Newspaper, 
1990–1997”).
CARL W. ROBERTS is an associate professor with a joint appointment in the Sociology 
and Statistics Departments at Iowa State University. His current research on theory 
(“The” Fifth Modality: On Languages That Shape Our Motivations and Cultures, 
Brill, 2008) and intercultural comparisons (“Modalities of Democratic Transformation: 
Forms of Public Discourse within Hungary’s Largest Newspaper,” International 
Sociology, forthcoming) is motivated by an interest in how language shapes perception 
and behavior. He has written extensively on linguistic structure in articles appearing 
in Social Forces and Sociological Methodology as well as in his edited collection, Text 
analysis for the Social Sciences (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997). His empirical work inves-
tigates cultural variations in social discourse based on sampled texts ranging from 
medieval documents to editorials in contemporary foreign and domestic newspapers.
 at University of Groningen on January 18, 2011fmx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
